The failure of Ontological Excess Baggage as a Criterion of the Ontic
  Approaches to Quantum Theory by Yong, Tung Ten
ar
X
iv
:1
00
5.
36
25
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
0 M
ay
 20
10
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Abstract
This article presents a discussion of the notion of quantum ontological excess
baggage, first proposed by Hardy. It is argued here that this idea does not have
the significance as suggested in his paper. It is shown that if this concept is
properly analyzed, it fails to pose any threat to the ontic approach to quantum
theory in general.
Keywords: Quantum theory, Ontic state, Instrumental state, Hidden variable,
Interpretation
1. Introduction
The issue of hidden variables in quantum mechanics is essentially the prob-
lem of finding an observer independent reality behind the quantum phenomena.
Hidden variables, be it deterministic or stochastic, should recover quantum me-
chanical predictions and experimental measurement results. Moreover, all ac-
ceptable hidden variable theories have to satisfy several no-go theorems, if they
are to give rise to the familiar structure of quantum mechanics. Although these
experimental and theoretical constraints do not constitute a refutation of the
hidden variable theories, they impose restrictions on the form and content of
any such theory.
In the paper Hardy (2004), Hardy presented yet another result in reducing
further the plausibility of any simplistic ontic embeddings of quantum mechan-
ics. He showed that for any such embeddings the amount of ontological resources
needed is unnecessarily large, if compared to the original, quantum resources
(quantum state descriptions). In other words, the probability simplex for the set
of epistemic states has infinitely many vertices, while that of the instrumental
states (quantum states) is finite (this is explained in the following section). On
the other hand, according to his argument, there is no such embedding overhead
in the case of classical theories, eg. classical statistical mechanics. The implica-
tion of this result for the hidden variable theories is that quantum theory is very
different from classical probabilistic theories in its relationship to any possible
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underlying ontic states. Any theory that ‘completes’ quantum theory will have
to assume a lot of superfluous quantities, infinitely many than is needed in a
classical theory. This, he claimed, renders the ontic approach very unattractive.
This paper argues that such a view is too hasty. It will be shown below that
if properly analyzed, infinite excess baggage also occurs in classical theories,
and thus it does not at all discredit the ontic point of view. The argument is
simple, but before that the relevant concepts and Hardy’s result will be briefly
recounted in the next section, followed by two sections on the counter arguments,
and another section that discusses the correct view that should be adopted.
2. Relevant concepts and Hardy’s result
First of all, the instrumental state p = (pk) of an object is a mathematical
entity that gives the probabilities of all the results for all possible measurements
that can be carried out on the object. Knowing the correct instrumental states
means knowing everything about the outcomes of any experiments. The most
trivial entity that does the job is simply the list of probabilities for all these
possible results. But usually there is some structure contraining or relating
the set of our possible measurements (as in quantum theory), and this usually
means that a shorter list of the probabilities can do the same job. So we need
only to consider the lists with the smallest number of probabilities. It turns
out that for a quantum object, this minimum number is equal to N2 where N
is demension of its Hilbert space. Denote this minimum number as Kinst (i.e.
1 ≤ k ≤ Kinst).
While the instrumental state let us predict probabilities of all outcomes in
our experiment done on a physical system, we would still like to know if these
states describe/contain everything there is about the reality of that physical
system. The ontic states si of the system describe its real state, independent
of any measurements. However we may not know the real state of the system,
our information/knowledge about the system is thus encapsulated by another
mathematical entity - the epistemic state P = (Pi). In classical statistical
mechanics, the ontic states are represented by the points in system’s phase
space, while the epistemic states are the probability distributions on the phase
space. Now denote the total number of the system’s ontic states as Kontic.
Kontic is thus the number of vertices of the epistemic probability simplex.
Our epistemic state reflects itself in the relation between instrumental states
and ontic states:
pk =
∑
λki Pi (1)
where λki denotes the probability that the ontic state si will trigger measurement
result k. This relation can be seen as mapping the points in epistemic probability
simplex to the points in the convex set of instrumental states.
Hardy’s paper then introduced the ratio
γ :=
Kontic
Kinst
(2)
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the ontological excess baggage factor, which by definition seems to be a measure
of how large the ontic state space should be in order to give rise to the set of
instrumental states. He showed that the factor is (a) infinite, in the quantum
case; while (b) equal to unity, in the classical case1. From this he concluded that
any ontological completion of quantum theory requires infinitely more resources
than that in the classical theories2.
3. Infinite excess baggage in the classical case
To see the inadequacy of the above result, I will first show, using a simple
example, that (b) is not unconditionally true, and that (a) does not has the
significance as proposed by Hardy in his paper. This is done by demonstrat-
ing that in the classical case the ontological excess baggage factor can also be
infinite:
Consider a kind of creature that possess far less knowledge than us about
the molecular structure of matter. In fact, they do not know, for example, that
the gas is composed of tiny molecules that contributes to the gas properties like
tempetature, pressure etc. However they are able to control the total energy
of the gas system, through manipulating, for example, its temperature. More
precisely, they can prepare the gas with any value of total energy, and they can
measure the total energy of any gas system given to him. Other than that, there
are no other ways that they can manipulate the system, or know more about
the system.
Therefore, the instrumental state of the gas, according to these creature, is
simply (p(H = E)) - the list of probabilities that the total energy of the system
takes the value E. There is not a shorter list for this because there are no
further structures for the values of H . Next, the ontological states of the gas
system, are its phase space points, as usual. These ontic states can be seen as
a completion of the creature’s instrumental description. Consider localized gas
systems, then for any value of H the system’s ontic state can be any point in a
finite region of phase space.
Now what is the value of γ? Since the system can have any (positive) total
energy, Kinst = ∞. Also, Kontic is also obviously infinite. However if careful
analysis is carried out, by first discretizing the ontic state space, we obtain that
for any value of H , there corresponds to a huge amount of ontic states. The
amount of these ontic states tends to infinity when the phase space discretization
goes over to continuity, for each and all values of H . This implies that γ =∞.
Therefore, contrary to Hardy’s argument about the classical case, in this
classical world we also have infinite ontological excess baggage for the creature’s
instrumental states. This means that his conclusion about the quantum case
1A minor point about his proof is that it actually accounts only for deterministic ontic
theory. A stochastic ontic theory does not require, as is in his proof, that A1(l′) has elements
in common with A1(l) or A2(l). However this does not affect his conclusion that γ is infinite.
2His proof for the quantum case will not be reproduced here, as the details are irrelevant
to my argument.
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(the correctness of which will be discussed in the next section) in fact does not
imply a fundamentally more difficult prospect for the ontic approach to quan-
tum theory, than for the completion of thermodynamics by the usual molecular
theory (via the usual classical statistical mechanics).
Some readers may object to the above argument that I am using the wrong
instrumental state here: the correct analysis should use the ontic states as the
instrumental states, just like Hardy’s analysis of the classical case. However
this is the wrong way of vewing things. Unlike us who knows that gases are
composed of molecules, these creatures cannot manipulate and do not have
any knowledge about the gas ontic states. All they can control with and read
out through their measurement apparatus are the values of the system’s total
energy H . By definition, instrumental state concerns only measurements that
are available to them. So they should (and can only) use the probabilities of
obtaining different H values as the appropriate instrumental state. In general,
the state space of instrumental states for a physical object (and thus Kinst)
changes when we have a different class of ways of interacting with the object.
In fact, this is what constantly going on in science, for example, according to
the 18th and 19th century scientists, their instrumental states for gas describes
its temperature, pressure, entropy etc.; whereas for the 21st century nanosci-
entists their instrumental states describes the position, momentum, size etc. of
the individual molecules in the gas.
4. The quantum case
We can also question Hardy’s argument about the quantum case. Particu-
larly, we question his use of ontological excess baggage as a criterion for deter-
mining the plausibility of the ontic approach. Note that our issue here concerns
whether excess baggage factor can serve as a legitimate criterion for choosing
certain theories, not about the correctness of Hardy’s argument as a logical ar-
gument that derives implications for the assumption that quantum states are the
instrumental states. As a logical derivation it is undoubtedly correct. But for
it to be a reasonable criterion, its truth or applicability should be independent
of the details of the ontic theories.
Now, as seen from discussion above, which kind of instrumental states are the
correct ones depends crucially on what we can measure on the physical object.
In Hardy’s argument the instrumental states are quantum states, and he shows
the ontological baggage is infinite for such instrumental state. However, he did
not question the role of quantum state as instrumental state in the face of our
possible knowledge about the ontic states. There are ontic theories where the
ontic states are measurable or distinguishable instrumentally, and thus form
(entirely or part of) the instrumental states.
As a consequence, his result is meaningful only when our knowledge about
the ontic states will not require us to revise the status of quantum states as the
correct instrumental state. This means that his result of infinite quantum ontic
baggage only discredits (here it is granted that having an infinite value really
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does so, see previous section) those ontic theories with ontic states that are for-
ever unmeasurable (lets call these theories UOT: unmeasurable ontic theories).
But for those ontic theories that requires a different set of instrumental states
than the quantum states (non-UOT), his result is irrelevant.
This will then give rise to two problems. First, we don’t need the concept of
ontological excess baggage to tell us that UOT are untenable. Such ontologies
are unattractive simply because they are forever hidden from observation, and
yet they affect (or even give rise to) all our measurements. Second, because of
its inability to deal with all ontic theories, ontological excess baggage fails as a
legitimate criteria for determining the plausibility of ontic theories.
5. The quantum relative ontological excess baggage
We can view the issue in another way. Since the instrumental state of a
physical system depends on observer’s knowledge and his ability to measure
the system, there is not a unique value of Kinst for a physical object. What
we should really have is (Kinst)level, the subscript ‘level’ denoting the level of
description or knowledge available to the observer about the object. For example
in the above example, the creatures have (Kinst)totalH , while human observers
have (Kinst)microscopic (‘microscopic’ denotes microscopic states - the molecular
positions and momenta).
From this we can define the quantum relative ontological excess baggage
factor:
γlevel :=
Kontic
(Kinst)level
(3)
The term ‘relative’ highlights the fact that the factor is not absolute nor unique
for a given object, but is relative to our knowledge and ability to measure it.
So for the creatures,
γtotalenergy :=
Kontic
(Kinst)totalenergy
=∞ (4)
While for human observers,
γmicroscopic :=
Kontic
(Kinst)microscopic
= 1 (5)
In the quantum case,
γquantum :=
Kontic
(Kinst)quantum
=∞ (6)
Discussions in the previous sections shows that, both in the case of creature
observers and that of quantum theory, having an infinite value of gamma does
not imply the implausibility of ontic approaches. Now, from the prespective of
relative ontological excess baggage, we find that in both of these cases Kontic
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and (Kinst)level are of different levels. This suggest that the failure of Hardy’s
argument as a criteria is due to the fact that his ontic baggage factor, γ, involves
different levels of K’s.
This is in fact not difficult to understand. If the ontic states are of a different
level than the instrumental states, the situation in section 4 arises - one cannot
guarantee that the instrumental states will remain the same given our knowledge
about ontic states. Consequently one cannot have any valid criteria based on
such concept.
This urges us to propose a theorem similar to the one in Hardy’s paper:
The Quantum Relative Ontological Excess Baggage Theorem.Given
that quantum states are the instrumental states, any interpretations/ theories
of quantum theory in which the quantum states are also the ontic states are very
uncomfortable. This is also true if quantum states themselves form parts or the
whole of ontology.
The proof for the first part of this theorem (when quantum states are ontic
states) is essentially the same with Hardy’s original theorem, but with gamma
replaced by γquantum := Kontic/(Kinst)quantum = Kontic/(Kinst)ontic (the last
equality is true by assumption of the theorem). We then simply have Kontic
(the number of distinct quantum states) = ∞ and (Kinst)ontic = N
2 and thus
γquantum = ∞, for such interpretations/theories. The second part of the the-
orem can be proved by simply noticing that, if quantum states themselves are
either the sole ontology or only part of it, the set of ontic states cannot have
less element than that of the quantum states, which is already ∞.
This theorem corrects the mistake of using a knowledge independent gamma.
It deals with the situation where the states in our theory are at the same level,
i.e. they are instrumental and are by interpretation or definition, ontic. It is the
correct version of Hardy’s theorem if we realise that the excess baggage factor
is meaningful only when it is defined on a single definite level of knowledge.
This theorem, in contrast to Hardy’s original theorem, does not discredit
the ontic approach in its entirety. It concerns only ontic theories in which the
quantum states are ontic states or in which the ontologies include the quantum
states. For example, the theorem implies the following approaches to quantum
theory are implausible:
(a) purely interpretational de Broglie-Bohm’s approach: Note that this con-
cerns the purely interpretational view of de Broglie-Bohm’s approach,
which means that the underlying particle positions can never be mea-
sured nor give rise to any measurable effect, and thus the quantum states
are in principle the only instrumental states (thus this does not concern
the pilot-wave approach as proposed by Valentini). In this approach the
wavefunction is part of the ontology and the ontic states are infinite in
number.
(b) Everettian many-worlds approach: There are many versions of this but we
restrict our concern with the most common version of it - there is only one
wavefunction, that of the universe, and it is the only ontology. Then even
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if the dimension of its Hilbert space is finite, there will still be continually
many possible wavefunctions, and thus infinite relative excess baggage.
6. Conclusion
There are two main results in this paper, the first is that Hardy’s argument
that ontic approaches to quantum theory requires an infinitely more superfluous
resources than that in classical theories is untenable. The second result is that
his quantum ontological excess baggage does not constitute a valid criterion for
determining the plausibility of the ontic approaches to quantum theory. The
reason for these mistakes is the failure to recognize that the instrumental states
need not be the quantum states in the face of our knowledge about the ontic
states. The correct form of the criterion, as proposed in this paper, is found to
rule out only certain approaches such as the Everettian interpretation and the
purely interpretational version of the de Broglie-Bohm theory.
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